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ABSTRACT
This article presents new British evidence that suggests that cutting working hours at
short notice is twice as prevalent as zero-hours contracts and triple the number of em-
ployees are very anxious about unexpected changes to their hours of work. The pay of
these employees tends to be lower, work intensity higher, line management support
weaker and the threat of dismissal and job loss greater. In addition, the well-being
of these employees is lower and they are less committed to the organisations that em-
ploy them. However, the prevalence of insecure working hours is reduced by work-
place level employee involvement exercised individually or through collective
representation.
1 INTRODUCTION
The growth of zero-hours contracts (ZHCs), the increase in levels of underemploy-
ment and the rise of the gig economy are all features of the UK economy that have
triggered much academic debate (Lepanjuuri et al., 2018; Koumenta and Williams,
2019; ONS, 2019a). They have also become the focus of high and sustained media at-
tention. For example, ZHCs rarely featured in newspaper articles or Internet searches
prior to 2013, but since then, they have been the source of regular commentary
(Farina et al., 2019). ZHCs have also prompted interest from government about ways
of mitigating some of their worst effects (e.g. BIS, 2013; BEIS, 2019).
These labour market developments are all symptoms of increased attempts by em-
ployers to align the duration and timing of work to the peaks and troughs in demand.
As a consequence, working time has become more unpredictable for many workers
(Rubery et al., 2015). Not knowing whether, when and how much work they will ac-
tually get can create problems for the individuals involved. It can make it difficult to
pay the weekly bills and plan for the future, and it can weaken job-related well-being
(Citizens Advice, 2017).
In response, the Living Wage Foundation recently launched a Living Hours cam-
paign designed to provide workers with greater security over working time. The
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Foundation accredits organisations that agree to pay the Real Living Wage (RLW) to
their direct employees and to those who normally work on their premises but are paid
by contractors (Prowse and Fells, 2016). However, the Foundation has recognised
that the unpredictability of working hours may mean that workers who receive the
RLW hourly rate of pay may not receive a decent wage if their hours are low
and/or are changed at short notice. Getting employers to provide Living Hours
alongside the RLW addresses this issue. In addition to paying the RLW, Living
Hours employers agree to (i) offer contracts that reflect actual hours worked and
guarantee a minimum of 16 hours a week and (ii) give employees at least four weeks’
notice of when they are expected to work and make payment in full if shifts are
cancelled (Living Wage Foundation, 2019). The first of these elements may receive
legislative backing with the UK government recently announcing that it plans ‘to
bring forward legislation that introduces a right for all workers to potentially move
towards a more predictable and stable contract’ (BEIS, 2019: 10). The second ele-
ment, however, has so far not received government backing, but changes in this area
are under review.
Much of the associated empirical evidence and debate on insecure working hours—
including the Living Hours campaign—focuses on the details of employment con-
tracts and/or respondents’ knowledge of what they contain. The approach presented
in this article widens the concept of insecure working hours by going beyond focusing
solely on the contractual form of the employment relationship (i.e. ZHCs) to include
actual experience of working hours being cut with little warning and anxiety about
unexpected changes to hours of work.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing
evidence on insecure working hours that has focused primarily on ZHCs. Section 3
outlines the data sources, methods used and approach taken to generate a wider set
of evidence. Where possible, this new evidence is set alongside data taken from the
Labour Force Survey (LFS) on ZHCs. This new evidence is taken from the Skills
and Employment Survey (SES) 2017 and questions it asks about employees’ experi-
ence of cuts being made to their weekly working hours and how anxious they feel that
their working hours might be changed unexpectedly by their employer. Section 4 uses
both data sources to present findings on the extent, characteristics and correlates of
four different measures of insecure working hours. Section 5 concludes by arguing
that if policy makers are serious about creating good work, more attention needs to
be paid to reducing the prevalence of unpredictable working hours rather than just fo-
cusing on formal aspects of the employment contract.
2 EXISTING EVIDENCE
In this article, we focus on two aspects of working time.1 The first is the duration of
time spent at work. This involves setting the daily, weekly or annual number of hours
to be worked and establishing whether the employer is at liberty to increase or de-
crease these totals. The second aspect is the timing of work. This refers to when during
the day, night, week or year work is performed. When combined, these two concep-
tual dimensions constitute a work schedule detailing how long work lasts and when
it takes place (Berg et al., 2004).
1 However, there are other dimensions of working time not covered here, such as the extent to which
workers can vary working hours to meet their own needs (Eurofound, 2012).
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In many societies, there are regulations on the maximum number of hours worked.
However, regulating the minimum number of hours worked and placing restrictions
on changes to the timing of work have received far less attention. Yet the length of
the working week and the hourly rate of pay determines the wage received, and the
timing of working hours influences how and at what cost commitments outside of
work such as childcare can be met.
Research based on the European LFS shows that employers even in more regulated
economies than the UK have reduced average hours through the increased use of
part-time work, casual contracts, ZHCs and reductions in working time. In
Denmark, for example, the yearly income of many workers is low despite relatively
high hourly pay and so in order to survive a large proportion of part-timers have
more than one job (Ilsøe et al., 2017). A persistently large gap between the number
of hours worked and the number desired—one measure of hours-constrained under-
employment—is also suggestive of the difficulties some workers face in making ends
meet. In the second quarter of 2019, 7.6 per cent or 2.5 million employees in the
UK reported that they wanted to work more hours in their existing job than they were
given (ONS, 2019a).
The growth of ZHCs gives employers greater ability to vary the number and timing
of hours and even to offer no work at all. In the absence of a guaranteed minimum
number of hours, workers may experience highly unpredictable work schedules. This
can have negative consequences (TUC, 2017). These include the uncertainty of a min-
imum weekly income, dependency on line management for the allocation of hours,
the inability to exercise real choice in taking the hours given for fear of being
‘zeroed-down’ as punishment and the difficulties of claiming benefits that often re-
quire claimants to work a minimum of 16 hours a week (Pennycook et al., 2013).
A key source of evidence in this debate is the LFS that has carried a question on
ZHCs since 1994. Respondents are asked whether their main job comprises one of
eight ‘special working hours arrangements’. ZHCs are seventh on the list with respon-
dents allowed to select up to three arrangements. If unsure, respondents are told that
a ZHC refers to a situation ‘where a person is not contracted to work a set number of
hours, and is only paid for the number of hours that they actually work’.
Analysis of this data source suggests that ZHCs quadrupled in size from 225,000
(0.8 per cent) in 2000 to 907,000 (2.9 per cent) in 2016 and have fallen a little since
then to 896,000 (2.7 per cent) in 2019 (ONS, 2019b). Further analysis suggests that
these contracts are disproportionately held by the young, the less well qualified and
those working in certain parts of the economy such as accommodation and food,
where almost a quarter of all ZHCs can be found (Adams and Prassl, 2018; Farina
et al., 2019; Koumenta and Williams, 2019).
In order to complement the employees’ perspective, ONS used to gather data from
a survey of around 5,000 employers. Nine waves of the survey were carried out be-
tween 2014 and 2017, but in November 2017, the series was discontinued. Evidence
from the 2017 survey suggests that there were 1.8 million contracts that did not guar-
antee workers a minimum number of hours and that they accounted for around one in
20 (6 per cent) employment contracts (Petkova, 2018).
Despite these insights, the ONS employer and individual-level data are restricted.
In the case of the business survey, the number of questions asked is limited, the data
are not available for secondary analysis and the survey is no longer carried out. The
LFS, on the other hand, provides more scope for secondary analysis given the number
of questions asked, its regularity and accessibility. Even so, many non-pay
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characteristics of jobs, which have a proven link to well-being, are absent (Felstead
et al., 2019). These include the intensity of work, the threat of dismissal, the level of
managerial support, the ability to take time off for emergencies and the probability
of job loss.
Other data sources provide a partial response to this neglect. Most notably, the
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) commissioned three sur-
veys of ZHCs—two focused on the experience of employers and one focused on em-
ployees. All three collect more extensive data than collected by ONS (CIPD, 2013 and
2015). The employee survey, for example, collected data on some features of job qual-
ity such as work-life balance, workload pressures and managerial support. Its results
highlight the unpredictability of work schedules for those on ZHCs with almost half
(46 per cent) having no notice at all when shifts are cancelled. The finding that only
one in 10 (9 per cent) of ZHC workers get more than four weeks’ notice when they
are not required illustrates the scale of the challenge facing the Living Hours cam-
paign that seeks to make this the norm (CIPD, 2013: table 17).
However, the experience of having working hours cut at short notice and anxiety
that unexpected changes will be made to work schedules does not just apply to ZHCs,
but can be experienced by other workers regardless of their contractual status. The
aim of this article is to quantify, profile and examine the correlates of these forms
of insecure working hours alongside ZHCs.
3 DATA SOURCES, METHODS AND APPROACH
Most of the comparative data on ZHCs presented in this article are taken from the
LFS for the second quarter of 2017 (i.e. April–June). This provides the most contem-
poraneous data to the Skills and Employment Survey 2017 (SES2017), interviewing
for this survey peaked towards the end of the second quarter of 2017. However, we
also draw on the fourth quarter LFS for 2017. We do so when examining the correla-
tion between ZHCs and the presence of trade unions in the workplace since that is the
only quarter where data on both ZHCs and unions are regularly collected.
SES2017 is the seventh in a series of nationally representative sample surveys of in-
dividuals in employment aged 20–65. The 2017 survey collected data from across
Britain. Respondents were interviewed face-to-face for about an hour in their own
homes. The sample was drawn using random probability principles subject to strati-
fication based on a number of socio-economic indicators. Only one eligible respon-
dent per address was randomly selected for interview, and 50 per cent of those
selected completed the survey. Data collection was directed by the authors and con-
ducted by GfK. A weight was computed to take into account the differential proba-
bilities of sample selection, the over-sampling of certain areas and some small
response rate variations between groups (defined by sex, age and occupation). All
of the descriptive analyses that follow use this weight to correct for sampling and
non-response biases (Felstead et al., 2015).
This article addresses the following research questions. How extensive are the var-
ious forms of insecure working hours? What are the characteristics of the employees
and employers involved? How is working hours insecurity related to other aspects
of job quality? Data on ZHCs come from the LFS. For other types of working hours
insecurity, such as the experience of cuts to hours of work at short notice and the level
of anxiety about unexpected changes to working hours, we draw on SES2017. Since
these particular SES questions were only asked of employees, we restrict the analysis
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of both data sets to employees, thereby ensuring that only like-for-like comparisons
are made. A mixture of descriptive and regression results is presented in what follows.
4 EXTENT, CHARACTERISTICS AND CORRELATES OF INSECURE
WORKING HOURS
4.1 Extent of insecure working hours
Despite its limitations, the LFS remains the key source of evidence on ZHCs (Chan-
dler and Barrett, 2013; ONS, 2014; Adams and Prassl, 2018: 8–9). It is therefore apt
that we start with estimates of the numbers of employees whose main job is carried
out on a ZHC basis. As outlined earlier, LFS respondents are asked whether their
main job can be categorised as one of eight ‘special working hours arrangements’. Re-
spondents are asked to choose up to three arrangements, thereby ensuring that ZHCs
are captured even if they are not the only arrangement mentioned.
However, two issues need to be borne in mind. First, the ‘special working arrange-
ments’ question is only asked in the spring and autumn quarters. Second, each quar-
terly LFS is made up of five waves, so that the same respondents are interviewed five
times over the course of 15 months. This means that if respondents fail to answer ‘spe-
cial working arrangements’ question when asked in, say, the spring quarter, it is not
possible to carry forward their response to that question from the winter quarter since
it is only asked every six months. Rather than treat these cases as missing, ONS rec-
ommends the use of imputation protocols that we have followed. These assume that
sample members who did not answer the question would have answered in similar
proportions to those who did. This minimises non-response bias and improves the
precision of the resulting estimates by boosting the sample size on which these calcu-
lations are made.
In order to provide a like-with-like comparison to SES2017, the LFS data reported
here are restricted to those living in Britain aged 20–65 years old inclusive and work-
ing as employees.2 The first row in Table 1, therefore, reports that at the time of
2 The self-employed were included in the ZHCs estimate given in Felstead et al. (2018); hence, small differ-
ences with the ZHC data presented here.
Table 1: Prevalence of insecure working hours
Type of insecure
working hours
Percentage of
employees
(1)
Number of
employees
(2)
Zero-hours contacts1 2.6 636,659
Cuts at short notice to weekly
working hours
4.9 1,216,600
Unexpected changes to working
hours (narrowly defined)
7.0 1,744,372
Unexpected changes to working
hours (widely defined)
25.1 6,214,325
1 The Labour Force Survey population weight is used to derive this estimate.
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SES2017, 640,000 employees were employed on a ZHC. This represents 2.6 per cent
of the employee population or around one in 40 jobs (Table 1).
SES2017 asks employees about the insecurity of working hours. The data pro-
duced go beyond employees’ awareness of the contractual terms and conditions
on which they are employed. It captures their actual experience of working hours
being cut with little warning and their anxiety about unexpected changes being
made to their hours of work. This first aspect is captured by affirmative responses
to the question: ‘Does your employer ever reduce your weekly hours of work at
short notice?’ This percentage is, then, multiplied by the estimated number of em-
ployees living in Britain aged 20–65 years old according to the LFS. Measured in
these terms, working hours insecurity is more widespread than ZHCs with 4.9 per
cent of employees—or 1.2 million people—having experienced cuts to their weekly
working hours at short notice.
SES2017 also asked how anxious employees were about ‘unexpected changes to my
hours of work’—this could be movements up or down in the number of hours worked
and/or changes to when work is carried out, that is, changes to the work schedule.
Respondents were offered four options: ‘very anxious’, ‘fairly anxious’, ‘not very anx-
ious’ and ‘not anxious at all’. We derive a narrow and broad measure of work sched-
uling anxiety based on the responses given. Our narrow measure takes those who
reported feeling very anxious about unexpected changes to hours of work, while
our broad measure includes those feeling very or fairly anxious. We refer to these
as ‘acute’ and ‘mild to acute’ anxiety, respectively. Based on this evidence, there are
about three times as many employees (7.0 per cent or 1.7 million people) who are
acutely anxious about unexpected changes to hours of work than there are employees
engaged on a ZHC. The proportion and numbers reporting mild to acute anxiety
levels are higher still (25.1 per cent or 6.2 million people).
While there is qualitative evidence on how various forms of insecurity—most nota-
bly ZHCs—can place financial pressures on workers and their families (e.g.
Pennycook et al., 2013; Pickavance, 2014; TUC, 2017), there is less evidence on the
association it has with worker well-being. Where it does exist, it is based on small
and sector-specific studies that often produce inconclusive results. For example, a sur-
vey of 199 care workers found that overall, those on ZHCs did not suffer from signif-
icantly lower mental health than other workers, but a greater proportion of them
reported experiencing very poor mental health (Ravalier et al., 2017). However,
SES2017 offers a robust, economy-wide basis on which to test the strength of the as-
sociation between insecure working hours and worker well-being.
SES2017 carries a battery of survey items designed to measure job-related well-
being, that is, the extent to which jobs prompt arousal and pleasure, or enthusiasm
for short (Warr, 1990). Respondents were asked: ‘Thinking of the past few weeks,
how much of the time has your job made you feel each of the following …?’ They
were given a series of adjectives, each describing a different feeling. To construct an
enthusiasm scale, we use responses given to the following: ‘cheerful’, ‘enthusiastic’,
‘optimistic’, ‘depressed’, ‘gloomy’ and ‘miserable’. The response set comprises six
points ranging from ‘never’ to ‘all of the time’. We devise a scale by averaging the re-
sponses given using a 1–6 scoring system (after reversing the three negative items in
the second half of the list). High enthusiasm equates to those who reported that their
job makes them feel positive ‘most’ or ‘all of the time’ (i.e. a score of 5 or 6), whereas
low enthusiasm captures those whose job makes them feel positive ‘some of the time’,
‘occasionally’ or ‘never’ (i.e. a score of 3, 2 and 1).
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However, jobs may simultaneously prompt high arousal and low pleasure or low
arousal and high pleasure—referred to as anxiety and contentment, respectively.
These job-related feelings are captured by the following adjectives: ‘worried’, ‘un-
easy’, ‘tense’, ‘content’, ‘relaxed’ and ‘calm’. Scores for the first three items are re-
versed, so that higher scores indicate higher contentment, and labelling contentment
as high or low equates to positive and negative feelings as outlined previously for
the enthusiasm scale.
The bivariate results show that the experience of cuts to working hours at short no-
tice and anxiety about unexpected changes to hours of work are associated with lower
levels of well-being as measured by levels of enthusiasm and contentment. For exam-
ple, over half (56.9 per cent) of those reporting acute anxiety also reported low enthu-
siasm levels compared with less than a third (30.6 per cent) of those who felt less
anxious about changes to their hours of work. The figures for low contentment are
74.1 and 59.3 per cent, respectively. Similarly, only around one in 12 (7.9 per cent)
of those who felt very or fairly anxious about changes to their working hours also re-
ported high levels of enthusiasm for their job compared with approaching a fifth
(18.4 per cent) who were not very anxious or not anxious at all. The figures for high
contentment are 3.3 and 7.3 per cent, respectively (Table 2). The statistical signifi-
cance of these results is confirmed in multivariate analysis. These use the two additive
scales as outcomes and take into account other explanatory factors such as social
class, education, industry and personality traits.
However, despite our bleak new evidence of extensive working hours insecurity, it
should also be noted that in 2017, the risk of job loss was at its lowest level in over
30 years. Less than one in 10 (9.2 per cent) of workers in Britain in 2017 reported that
they had a better than evens chance of losing their job in the next 12 months. This is
half the proportion (18.2 per cent) who made a similar assessment in 2012. Anxiety
about changes to the job has also fallen dramatically. For example, in 2012,
Table 2: Insecure working hours and well-being
Type of insecure
working hours
Job-related well-being1
Low
enthusiasm
(1)
High
enthusiasm
(2)
Low
contentment
(3)
High
contentment
(4)
Row percentage
Cuts at short notice
to weekly working
hours
Yes 42.0 14.9 66.7 1.0
No 32.0 15.8 60.0 6.6
Unexpected changes
to working hours
(narrowly defined)
Yes 56.9 9.2 74.1 3.2
No 30.6 16.3 59.3 6.5
Unexpected changes
to working hours
(widely defined)
Yes 48.0 7.9 71.9 3.3
No 27.2 18.4 56.4 7.3
1 The row totals are not equal to 100 per cent because 45.1 and 31.1 per cent of employees have
an enthusiasm and contentment score, respectively, ≥4 but <5 (i.e. much of the time).
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37.3 per cent of employees were anxious about having a pay cut, but by 2017, this had
fallen to 28.4 per cent (Felstead et al., 2018).
4.2 Characteristics of insecure hours workers and their jobs
There are a number of studies that have examined the demographic and socio-
economic characteristics of those working on ZHCs (e.g. Adams and Prassl, 2018;
Farina et al., 2019; Koumenta and Williams, 2019). They have identified that ZHCs
are more prevalent among women, the young and the old, ethnic minorities, disabled
people, the lower qualified, part-timers, temporary workers, those in lower social clas-
ses, those outside the public sector and those working in distribution, hotels and res-
taurants or other services. This is confirmed by our analysis (Table 3).
While many of these patterns are repeated for other forms of insecure working
hours, the contrasts are often not as pronounced. Take gender where most, but not
all, types of insecurity are more prevalent among women than men. For example,
3.1 per cent of female employees are on ZHCs, while 1.8 per cent of men are similarly
engaged. However, both sexes are more or less equally represented among those
experiencing cuts to working hours at short notice.
The experience of insecure working hours and anxiety about unexpected changes to
work schedules are also spread more evenly across social classes, contract types and
hours worked. Rarely, for example, do those in the ‘higher managerial and profes-
sional’ class report being on a ZHC (0.3 per cent). This compares with one in 20
(5.0 per cent) ‘routine’ workers. The class gradient for other forms of insecurity is
not as steep. For example, around one in 12 ‘higher managers and professionals’
(13.8 per cent) report feeling very or fairly anxious about unexpected changes to their
work schedule. This compares with 29.8 per cent for ‘routine’ workers. Similar pat-
terns are found elsewhere in the data. Around a fifth (18.2 per cent) of temporary
workers, for example, report being on a ZHC compared with only one in 50
(1.7 per cent) of those in permanent jobs. For other types of working hours insecurity,
the permanent versus temporary contrast, while still evident, is not as dramatic—a
quarter (24.8 per cent) of permanent workers report feeling very or fairly anxious that
their work schedule may change unexpectedly compared with 29.3 per cent of those
on temporary contracts.
These descriptive patterns could, of course, be artefacts of the data; that is, these
bivariate contrasts may disappear when other associations are simultaneously taken
into account. To test the robustness of the findings, we therefore carry out four logis-
tic regressions that simultaneously control for demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics along with personality traits. The latter are entered to control for subjective
differences in outlook when respondents are asked to self-rate their levels of anxiety
about unexpected changes to hours of work.
This analytical approach reinforces many of the descriptive findings. It confirms,
for example, that ZHCs are strongly related to age—with the young and old signifi-
cantly more likely to be engaged on such contracts holding other things constant.
By contrast, experience of cuts to working hours and anxiety about changes to work
schedules are reported more or less equally across all age groups. The odds of being
on a ZHC, for example, are 1.7 times higher for those in their twenties or sixties than
for those in their forties. However, the odds of experiencing or feeling anxious about
changes to work schedules do not vary significantly by age (Table 4). Ethnic minori-
ties, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to report all four forms of
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working hours insecurity, and those with a disability or poorer health have signifi-
cantly higher odds of being on ZHC or feeling anxious about changes to their hours
of work.
The multivariate results also confirm a stronger social class gradient for ZHCs and
cuts to working hours compared with anxiety about unexpected changes to work
schedules. For example, the odds of being on a ZHC for ‘higher managers and profes-
sionals’ are 0.3 times the odds for ‘intermediate’ workers, while for ‘routine’ workers,
the multiple is 2.8. The contrast, however, is narrower for anxiety about changes to
work schedules—varying from 0.3 and 0.5 for ‘higher managers and professionals’
to no significant difference at all for ‘routine’ workers.
In addition, these results highlight the statistically strong association between
ZHCs and temporary working. The odds of temporary workers being on ZHCs are
11.3 times the odds of permanent workers being similarly engaged. The odds are
lower for other forms of insecurity—4.2 in the case of experiencing cuts to working
hours, 1.8 for feeling very anxious about unexpected changes to work schedules and
statistical parity for those feeling very or fairly anxious about changes to hours of
work. Part-timers are also more likely to be on a ZHC compared with their otherwise
identical full-time equivalents—2.2 times as likely in fact. In addition, their odds of
experiencing cuts to weekly working hours are 1.7 times the odds of permanent
workers experiencing cuts. But these differences disappear and even move in favour
of part-timers for those feeling very anxious about changes to their hours of work.
While we can use the data at our disposal to compare the demographic and socio-
economic profiles of those on ZHCs with other forms of working hours insecurity, we
can also examine the association that insecure working hours has with other aspects
of job quality. After taking into account differences in employee characteristics, we
find that those on ZHCs as well as those who experience cuts to working hours are
significantly more likely to be low paid (that is, paid below £7.50 an hour, the Na-
tional Living Wage for those aged 25 or over in 2017). However, raw differences in
their hourly pay can be explained by demographic and socio-economic factors. This
suggests that ZHC workers and those subjected to cuts to hours of work at short no-
tice are clustered towards the bottom of the pay hierarchy. On the other hand, those
whose jobs make them anxious about unexpected changes to hours of work are paid
4–5 per cent less than otherwise identical individuals, but they are unlikely to be clas-
sified as lowly paid (Table 5). This suggests that anxiety about changes to work sched-
ules is spread more evenly across the pay distribution.
In addition, jobs that provide insecure working hours are poorer, on average, in
other respects. For example, they are significantly more likely to be required to work
very hard, and to operate at very high speed and to tight deadlines for three-quarters
or more of the time. They are also significantly more likely to be working in condi-
tions where they are at risk of being quickly dismissed (less than one week) for not
working hard enough and where they have an evens or higher chance of losing their
job in the next 12 months. Those working insecure hours are also less able to easily
‘take an hour or two off during working hours to take care of personal or family mat-
ters’ and are less likely to have supportive line managers willing to develop the skills
of those in their charge, recognise the abilities of their staff and ease the pressure of
work when necessary (note the significance of the coefficients reported in Table 5).
Working hours insecurity may also carry costs for employers if associated with
lower levels of organisational commitment. This can, in turn, reduce employee moti-
vation and weaken business performance (Allen and Meyer, 1990; Steers et al., 2004).
15Insecure hours of work in Britain
© 2020 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
T
ab
le
5:
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d
jo
b
qu
al
it
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
th
os
e
w
or
ki
ng
in
se
cu
re
ho
ur
s
Jo
b
qu
al
it
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
Z
er
o-
ho
ur
s
co
nt
ra
ct
s
(1
)
C
ut
s
at
sh
or
t
no
ti
ce
to
w
or
ki
ng
ho
ur
s
(2
)
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d
ch
an
ge
s
to
w
or
ki
ng
ho
ur
s
V
er
y
an
xi
ou
s
(3
)
V
er
y
+
F
ai
rl
y
an
xi
ou
s
(4
)
C
or
re
la
ti
on
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
1
L
ow
pa
y
(<
£7
.5
0
an
ho
ur
)—
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
0.
42
4*
*
(0
.1
77
)
0.
48
2*
(0
.2
67
)
0.
03
8
(0
.2
42
)
0.
15
9
(0
.1
59
)
H
ou
rl
y
ra
te
of
pa
y
(l
og
ge
d)
—
co
nt
in
uo
us
0.
12
7
(0
.8
02
)
0.
04
8
(0
.0
39
)
0
.0
52
*
(0
.0
30
)
0
.0
40
**
(0
.0
19
)
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
t
to
w
or
k
ve
ry
ha
rd
—
or
de
re
d
N
A
0.
28
9*
**
(0
.1
08
)
0.
25
5*
**
(0
.0
87
)
0.
11
9*
**
(0
.0
54
)
W
or
ki
ng
at
ve
ry
hi
gh
sp
ee
d
fo
r
¾
or
m
or
e
of
th
e
ti
m
e—
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
N
A
0.
52
4*
**
(0
.1
90
)
0.
74
7*
**
(0
.1
53
)
0.
53
8*
**
(0
.0
94
)
W
or
ki
ng
to
ti
gh
t
de
ad
lin
es
fo
r
¾
or
m
or
e
of
th
e
ti
m
e—
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
N
A
0.
60
5*
**
(0
.1
99
)
0.
62
2*
**
(0
.1
59
)
0.
33
1*
**
(0
.0
96
)
T
hr
ea
t
of
qu
ic
k
di
sm
is
sa
l
(a
ft
er
le
ss
th
an
on
e
w
ee
k)
fo
r
no
t
w
or
ki
ng
ha
rd
en
ou
gh
—
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
N
A
0.
66
3*
*
(0
.2
84
)
0.
59
8*
*
(0
.2
71
)
0.
80
0*
**
(0
.1
92
)
E
ve
ns
or
hi
gh
er
ch
an
ce
of
jo
b
lo
ss
—
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
N
A
0.
50
8*
(0
.2
90
)
0.
63
7*
**
(0
.2
27
)
0.
84
5*
**
(0
.1
58
)
E
as
y
to
ta
ke
ti
m
e
of
f
fo
r
em
er
ge
nc
ie
s—
or
de
re
d
N
A
0
.3
36
**
*
(0
.0
97
)
0
.4
08
**
*
(0
.0
78
)
0
.4
00
**
*
(0
.0
49
)
L
in
e
m
an
ag
em
en
t
su
pp
or
t
in
m
an
ag
in
g
w
or
k
pr
es
su
re
,
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t
an
d
ab
ili
ti
es
—
co
nt
in
uo
us
N
A
0
.4
02
**
(0
.0
97
)
0
.2
36
**
*
(0
.0
75
)
0
.2
06
**
*
(0
.0
48
)
1
Se
pa
ra
te
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
s
ar
e
ru
n
fo
r
ea
ch
jo
b
qu
al
it
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
w
it
h
co
nt
ro
ls
as
pe
r
T
ab
le
3.
O
L
S
fo
r
co
nt
in
uo
us
jo
b
qu
al
it
y
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s,
or
de
re
d
pr
ob
it
s
fo
r
or
di
na
lj
ob
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
an
d
lo
gi
st
ic
re
gr
es
si
on
s
fo
r
di
ch
ot
om
ou
s
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s.
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
on
th
e
re
le
va
nt
in
se
cu
re
w
or
ki
ng
ho
ur
s
va
ri
ab
le
ar
e
re
po
rt
ed
.
*
p<
0.
1;
**
p<
0.
5;
**
*
p<
0.
1;
an
d
bo
ld
fi
gu
re
s
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
l
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e
at
p<
0.
1
or
be
tt
er
.
16 Alan Felstead, Duncan Gallie, Francis Green and Golo Henseke
© 2020 The Authors. Industrial Relations Journal published by Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
SES2017 carries survey questions that capture employees’ attitudes towards their or-
ganisations and the nature of their behaviour at work. Respondents were asked six
questions—three on attitudes and three on behaviours. For the analysis, we first
award scores of 4 for ‘strongly agree’, 3 for ‘agree’, 2 for ‘disagree’ and 1 for ‘strongly
disagree’ according to the responses given. For presentational purposes, we refer to
those who on average agreed with the six statements (i.e. had a score of 3 or 4) as
exhibiting high organisational commitment and those who disagreed as having low
commitment (i.e. scored 1 or 2). An index of organisational commitment is also cre-
ated by adding the scales and dividing by six.
The results show a strong association between working hours insecurity and the
strength of organisational commitment. Greater insecurity is associated with lower
organisational commitment and vice versa (Table 6). There is, for example, a 10 per-
centage point gap between the proportion of employees reporting a high level of
organisational commitment according to their experience or otherwise of cuts to
working hours at short notice (28.3 versus 38.8 per cent). These descriptive results
are confirmed in multivariate analysis for two out of three of the SES insecurity indi-
cators; the association between the organisational commitment index and cuts to
working hours is negative, but falls short of the high levels of statistical significance
reached by the two anxiety indicators (p < 0.14).
These results suggest that the practice of rescheduling work at short notice and/or
creating anxiety among workers that working hours might be changed unexpectedly
can carry costs for employers. Reducing the affective bonds that workers have with
their employer can have negative consequences for organisational citizenship behav-
iour. This includes weakening employees’ willingness to offer innovative ideas to im-
prove business performance; go the extra mile when necessary; do the work when
Table 6: Insecure working hours and organisational commitment
Type of insecure working hours Organisational commitment1
Low
(1)
High
(2)
Row percentage
Cuts at short notice to weekly
working hours
Yes 13.0 28.3
No 8.4 38.8
Unexpected changes to working
hours (narrowly defined)
Yes 13.7 35.9
No 8.2 38.4
Unexpected changes to working
hours (widely defined)
Yes 12.5 31.5
No 7.2 40.6
1 Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed using a four-point scale with
the following statements: (1) ‘I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help this
organisation succeed’; (2) ‘I feel very little loyalty to this organisation’ (note reversal); (3) ‘I find
that my values and the organisation’s values are very similar’; (4) ‘I am proud to be working for
this organisation’; (5) ‘I would take almost any job to keep working for this organisation’; and
(6) ‘I would turn down another job with more pay in order to stay with this organisation’. The
row totals are not equal to 100 per cent because over half (53.7 per cent) of employees have an
organisational commitment score >2 but <3 (i.e. averaging between disagree and agree).
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required and to the necessary standard; and remain with the organisation even when
offered better pay (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Mayer and Allen, 1997). Lower
organisational commitment associated with insecure working hours, then, carries
costs in terms of lost ideas, less discretionary effort, higher absenteeism and increased
recruitment and training costs incurred as the result of higher labour turnover
(Rubery et al., 2015). The scale of insecure working hours is particularly worrying
at time when policy makers are concerned about the failure of productivity in Britain
to return to its pre-Great Recession rate (Moore and Hayes, 2017).
4.3 Workplace correlates of insecure working hours
We now turn to the workplace correlates of insecure working hours. For this part of
the analysis, we carry out four logistic regressions to test the association that various
workplace factors have with ZHCs, experience of cuts to working hours and anxiety
about unexpected changes to working hours.
Despite arguments suggesting that trade unions can be a force for good (e.g.
Dromey, 2018), it is a little surprising that the existing literature has failed to examine
the association that trade union presence at the workplace has with ZHCs. This is
even more surprising given the findings reported in Table 7. These suggest that the
presence of trade unions at the workplace is a force for good with their presence neg-
atively and significantly associated with the likelihood of employees being employed
on a ZHC or of having working hours cut at short notice. However, the presence of
trade unions is not associated with a reduction in anxiety about unexpected changes
to work schedules.
Research on the role played by trade unions in mitigating the rise of ZHCs has
identified the mechanisms that might help to explain these correlations. These include
the role of trade unions in mounting sector-wide campaigns, applying company spe-
cific pressure and lobbying national and devolved governments to act (Murphy
et al., 2019). Both Unison and Unite, for example, have issued charters in recent
years. In 2018, Unite issued a Construction Charter as well as a Fair Hospitality
Charter, while Unison launched its Ethical Care Charter in 2012 with the aim of pro-
moting both good standards of domiciliary care and good employment practices
(Moore, 2017). These charters put the spotlight on employment practices that have
detrimental effects on workers and are prevalent in particular sectors. By 2019, more
than 40 local authorities had signed up to the Ethical Care Charter and therefore
made a public commitment, for example, to minimise the use of ZHCs.
In addition, there have been high profile, trade union-led campaigns targeted at
particular companies such as Sports Direct. These have often centred on the harsh
employment conditions that workers endure and the treatment of ‘workers as com-
modities rather than as human beings with rights, responsibilities and aspirations’
(House of Commons, 2016: 12). Trade union organisers have, therefore, been on
the look-out for and keen to challenge the use of similar practices elsewhere that
are often typified by the extensive use of ZHCs.
In some parts of the UK, trade unions have also been successful in lobbying others
to take action. In Wales, for example, the Wales Trades Union Congress worked with
Welsh Government and employer representatives to develop a set of employment
principles. These are intended to give public sector workers greater certainty over
the number and scheduling of their working hours (Welsh Government, 2016). In so-
cial care, some of these principles have been enshrined in law on the grounds that
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poor employment conditions can undermine the quality of care provided (The
Regulated Services (Service Providers and Responsible Individuals) (Wales)
Regulations 2017).
The data also suggest that the level of direct employee involvement in decision-
making at work is associated with lower prevalence of insecure working hours with
the level of say over proposed changes to job design being negatively and significantly
correlated with all three SES measures. Task discretion is similarly correlated with
one of the three measures, but at relatively low levels of statistical significance
(p < 0.10). This evidence highlights that employees can exert pressure on employers
seeking to align the duration and timing of work to the peaks and troughs in demand
by varying the working hours of employees. This could be through employees: voicing
their concerns about the difficulties insecure working hours poses for workers;
highlighting the costs that employers may incur as a result of transferring the unpre-
dictability of demand onto workers; and/or suggesting that other forms of flexible
working, which offer ‘two-sided flexibility’ that suit the needs of both workers and
employers, are used instead (Low Pay Commission, 2018: 10).
Workplace change as measured by work reorganisation, the introduction of new
technology or downsizing is positively and significantly correlated with SES-
measured aspects of insecure working hours. Furthermore, all three forms of
workplace change are associated with a greater likelihood that employees report mild
or acute anxiety over unexpected changes to their work schedules. The strength of
competition faced by the organisation may also prompt employers to change hours
of work in line with peaks and troughs in demand. There is some evidence in the data
for this prediction. Measured on a five-point scale, the strength of competition is
positively and significantly correlated with the experience of cuts being made to
working hours at short notice, but not with anxiety about unexpected changes to
hours of work.
5 CONCLUSION
The notion of insecurity has widened since the Great Recession from a narrow focus
on the risk of job loss to a wider focus on changes within the job, such as receiving a
pay cut or being redeployed to a less interesting job (Gallie et al., 2017). Insecurity
over the scheduling of working hours has also captured particular attention with a
spike of interest in ZHCs from academics, policy makers and civil society organisa-
tions. Not knowing whether, when and how much work will be available can
create problems for workers, such as making it difficult to pay the bills and to plan
for the future.
The results presented in this article suggest that insecurity over working hours is
more widely experienced and felt than the prevalence of ZHCs suggests. One in 14
employees (7.0 per cent) report feeling very anxious that their working hours could
change unexpectedly and one in four (25.1 per cent) report feeling fairly or very anx-
ious that this will happen. This equates to 1.7 million and 6.2 million employees re-
spectively and—using like for like comparisons—is between three to nine times the
estimate of 640,000 employees who work on ZHCs according to official data. Even
reports of cuts to weekly working hours at short notice are more frequent than ZHCs
(4.9 versus 2.6 per cent). Taken together these estimates have been recognised by the
UK government as providing ‘a benchmark estimate of the scale of the issue’ (BEIS,
2019: 10).
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That said, there are limitations to the data we present. The cuts to weekly working
hours question, for example, asks employees if their employer has ever reduced hours
at short notice. We have no way of telling, therefore, how frequently this occurred
and when, and how ‘short notice’ is defined. Similarly, the question on unexpected
changes to working hours is couched in terms of feelings of anxiety. The data col-
lected are inevitably influenced by two factors: estimates of the probability that hours
of work will change unexpectedly and the personal circumstances and/or background
of respondents. For this reason, personality traits of employees are entered into our
multivariate models. This partially controls for, but does not fully illuminate, system-
atic biases of this sort.
Despite these limitations, the article shows that insecurity over working hours is a
feature of a wider range of jobs and is reported by a wider spectrum of people than a
narrow focus on ZHCs implies. Those working insecure hours also tend to occupy
jobs that are poorer in other ways too with higher work intensity, greater threat of dis-
missal, higher risk of job loss and less in-work and out-of-work support. In addition,
the job-related well-being of such employees tends to be lower and their
organisational commitment weaker.
This evidence suggests that the short-term gains employers may reap from insecure
working hours may be outweighed by the longer term losses incurred from lower
levels of organisational commitment and worker well-being. On this basis, there is a
business case for shifting the balance so that workers are given greater security over
hours of work. The UK government is currently consulting on how this might be done
(BEIS, 2019). This follows an investigation by the Low Pay Commission (2018) car-
ried out at the suggestion of the Taylor Review and its recommendation that the ‘Gov-
ernment must take steps to ensure that flexibility does not benefit the employer at the
unreasonable expense of the worker’ (Taylor, 2017: 44). The evidence of this article
suggests that what is referred to by the Taylor Review as ‘one-sided flexibility’ includes
and goes beyond those on ZHCs. The actions taken by the UK government, such as
introducing legislation on ‘reasonable notice’ of work schedules, must therefore apply
to all employees and not be limited to those on particular contracts.
The article also adds a new perspective to the debate by highlighting that the prev-
alence of insecure working hours is reduced by workplace level employee involvement
either exercised directly through individual participation in decision-making or indi-
rectly through trade union presence at the workplace. The evidence presented in this
article, then, suggests that another way to reduce working hours insecurity, and there-
fore making work better, is for the UK government—and the devolved administra-
tions in so far as they can—to promote individual and collective employee
involvement at work.
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